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MOOSEGUARD: SECURE FILE SHARING AT SCALE IN UNTRUSTED
ENVIRONMENTS
Joseph C. Baker, M.S.
University of Pittsburgh, 2020
Shared storage systems provide cheap, scalable, and reliable storage, but secure sharing
in these systems requires users to encrypt their data and limit efficient sharing or trust a
service provider to faithfully keep their data private. Current research has explored the use of
trusted execution environments (TEEs) to operate on sensitive data and sharing policies in
isolated execution. That work enables the utilization of untrusted shared resources to store
and share sensitive data while maintaining stronger security guarantees. However, current
research has limitations in scaling these solutions, as it bottlenecks both metadata and data
operations within the same physical TEE, whereas a scaled file system distributes metadata
and data operations to separate devices.
This paper explores the use of two TEEs specialized for metadata and data operations
to provide file sharing at scale with less overhead in addition to strong security guarantees.
This approach achieves scaled metadata and concurrent use by utilizing a server-side TEE
for isolated execution on a master server and provides data privacy and efficient access
revocation through a client-side TEE. MooseGuard is the prototype implementation of this
design, utilizing Intel SGX as a TEE and extending the MooseFS distributed file system.
MooseGuard’s implementation details the modifications needed to provide security and shows
how this approach can be applied to a typical distributed file system. An evaluation of
MooseGuard demonstrates that TEEs specialized for metadata and data operations allow a
secured distributed file system to maintain its scale with only constant overheads. As TEEs
and secure hardware become more widely available in public clouds, enterprise, and personal
devices, MooseGuard presents a way for users to get the best of both worlds in data privacy
and efficient sharing when using scaled, shared storage systems.
Keywords: Security; Distributed File Systems; Intel SGX; MooseFS; Cloud.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
Shared storage solutions such as cloud storage or distributed file systems in private data
centers allow users to easily store and share large amounts of data. However, using cloud
storage requires users to accept terms of service that do not hold the cloud service provider
accountable for lapses in privacy [4, 8], and private data centers need to enforce segmented
access to systems to achieve security requirements. Unintentionally or otherwise, there are
cases where a cloud service provider or a private data center can leak user data [14, 3, 15].
These terms of service and restricted utilization of resources combined with the likelihood
of a data breach present an ultimatum. Users must sacrifice the privacy of their data or the
efficiency of sharing that these scaled services provide. This leaves existing users’ sensitive
data vulnerable and prohibits users with stricter privacy requirements from deploying cloud-
based storage solutions or utilizing shared infrastructure.
Past efforts to protect sensitive data have required users to either place additional trust in
service providers and their platforms or to use a solution that performs client-side encryption,
but suffers from expensive or complex access revocation [22, 29, 31, 33, 40]. More recent
research has explored the use of trusted execution environments (TEEs) to implement file
sharing mechanisms with stronger security guarantees while requiring less trust in the service
provider [27, 35]. These approaches have shown the feasibility of using TEEs to perform file
sharing, but have limitations in scale due to hardware restrictions or no server-side support.
Typical distributed file systems (DFSes) are organized so that data-bound operations
can be distributed to clients and storage servers and metadata-bound operations can be
distributed to a master server. Recent works to enable secure file sharing utilize a single
TEE on each device to perform sensitive data and metadata operations. NeXUS [27] uses
only client-side enclaves, which limits the scale of metadata and concurrent use with the file
system as clients must synchronize and share metadata updates. Pesos [35] uses server-side
enclaves for policy enforcement but requires specialized hard drives to keep data secure.
This paper considers the use of two types of enclaves, allowing each enclave to specialize in
metadata- and data- bound operations respectively. This approach allows a DFS to maintain
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its typical architecture of separating metadata and data operations, providing greater scaling
of metadata and users and smaller overheads while maintaining the security of users’ data.
This paper presents MooseGuard, an approach to extend a distributed file system de-
ployed in an untrusted environment that can provide secure scalable storage, and efficient
file sharing and access revocation. This paper first abstracts the required behavior for this
goal, then presents an approach for implementing a solution in a way that is compatible
with a broad class of DFSes. The basis for additional security in a DFS stems from the
observation that a DFS may utilize modern approaches to authorize users and encrypt file
data, but this is insufficient if users cannot trust the platform the file system runs on or
if the file system cannot trust users to honestly execute file encryption. A service provider
can arbitrarily abuse a master server to change the file system, network traffic can be ma-
nipulated, and clients can ignore access revocation to file data by directly accessing storage
servers or reusing old file encryption keys. MooseGuard identifies that sensitive operations
must be executed in isolation from an untrusted host, including metadata and user login
operations on a master server and file encryption and access enforcement on a client.
MooseGuard’s generalized approach leverages TEEs to perform isolated execution for
both clients and servers within the file system. This enables the use of a master server in
an untrusted environment for greater scaling of the file system, and a client enclave allows
key sharing between users without requiring re-encryption of data when access is revoked.
To address the required improvements in a DFS, MooseGuard uses common features of
TEEs to strengthen the security of the file system in the face of untrusted client and server
behavior. Specifically, this is accomplished by protecting the confidentiality and integrity of
user data and metadata, ensuring consistent and integrity-protected metadata operations,
and implementing stricter user logins that operate within a TEE and enforce correct file
permissions.
The MooseGuard prototype is implemented using the distributed file system MooseFS
[9] and Intel SGX [39] as a TEE. In addition to generalizing the approach to securing a
DFS, this paper presents the details of this prototype implementation and an evaluation
of the prototype. The findings in the evaluation show that using both client and server
enclaves in a DFS allows for both file sharing and privacy with much greater scale than
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in previous efforts. Previous efforts like NeXUS showed greater than linear overheads in
scaled metadata operations and limited focus of concurrent use to personal-sized workloads.
MooseGuard improves upon these results by enabling scaled sizes of data storage, metadata
structure sizes, and concurrent client usage with constant overheads. With TEEs becoming
increasingly available, especially in cloud environments [11], MooseGuard can enable efficient
and secure file sharing in the cloud for more users and more data.
This paper presents the following contributions:
1. The requirements of a secure DFS on an untrusted platform and a novel approach to
securing a DFS for deployment on an untrusted environment using client- and server-
side TEEs.
2. MooseGuard, a prototype implementation of this approach using Intel SGX enclaves and
MooseFS.
3. An evaluation of the overheads that this approach introduces with focuses on file and
metadata benchmarks and different applied uses of a DFS.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Chapter 2 provides the neces-
sary background including MooseGuard’s goals, deployment and threat models, overviews
of the technologies used, and a summary of related works. Chapter 3 presents MooseGuard,
detailing it’s design considerations and implementation. Chapter 4 analyzes the security
guarantees of MooseGuard given the threat model and the design of MooseGuard. Chapter
5 describes the evaluation of MooseGuard and a discussion of the results of this evaluation.
The paper concludes with a summary and future work in Chapter 6.
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2.0 BACKGROUND
Shared storage services often provide cheaper, more resilient storage while enabling shar-
ing of data with ease. However, current shared storage models on untrusted platforms require
users to choose between efficient file sharing and data privacy. This trade-off stems from
the analysis that key management and access revocation while sharing encrypted data is
often prohibitively expensive [32]. This limitation hinders many common use cases of scaled
storage, such as sensitive government or medical data, from utilizing the cloud. Service
providers and cloud users have even worked around this problem by enumerating special
end-user license agreements or other contracts to ensure that service providers do more than
act in good faith to protect users’ sensitive data [2, 13].
MooseGuard’s use of TEEs proposes an alternate approach to store and share private
data in an insecure environment. MooseGuard’s efforts are guided by two goals. The first goal
is to provide a secure and scalable file system by protecting the confidentiality and integrity
of user data while enabling sharing and efficient access control and preventing unauthorized
modifications of the file system state. The second goal is to provide an approach to protecting
data that can be implemented on a typical distributed file system with minimal operational
overhead. These goals make MooseGuard worthwhile by providing an attainable solution to
the problem at hand.
Private data centers and cloud services frequently virtualize applications so the manage-
ment of services can be abstracted from the maintenance of hardware and software infras-
tructure. Segmented access to hardware has been used to ensure stricter security guarantees,
but requiring this prevents providers from further applying this abstraction and achieving
greater scale. This paper envisions the deployment of a DFS with MooseGuard enhance-
ments in an untrusted environment. By utilizing TEEs instead of segmenting whole systems,
this deployment model allows a DFS to be run as-a-service, restoring the virtualization of
services. Figure 1 illustrates this intended deployment model for MooseGuard.
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Figure 1: MooseGuard Deployment
2.1 THREAT MODEL
MooseGuard assumes an adversary with abilities similar to adversaries discussed in re-
lated TEE-based research [27]. An attacker can manipulate the execution of all software
outside of a TEE and manipulate the operation of all of a platform’s hardware except the
SGX-enabled CPU. This includes access to the service provider’s platform OS and hyper-
visor. The attacker can also observe, modify, drop, and reorder any network transmissions
between clients and the service provider’s platform. MooseGuard trusts that the CPU pack-
age is not physically tampered with. Further, MooseGuard assumes that SGX’s isolated
execution, attestation, and sealing mechanisms operate correctly. Finally, MooseGuard as-
sumes that MooseFS, MooseGuard, and SGX SDK [5] code implemented within the TEE’s
trusted codebase (TCB) is free from bugs and security vulnerabilities.
The master server and storage servers of this DFS are expected to be deployed in a
possibly untrustworthy platform where an adversary can apply all of its abilities listed above.
Though client devices may be partitioned on a separate network, as shown in Figure 1,
MooseGuard assumes that a client device is susceptible to the same attacks as a master
or storage server and is therefore hosted on an untrusted platform. Because clients are
not initially trusted, MooseGuard validates the integrity, authenticity, and authorization of
clients before sharing sensitive information. MooseGuard does not protect plaintext sensitive
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data outside of the client enclave on client systems and assumes that clients will take proper
steps to keep this data private from such an adversary. This assumption considers the
common case where client’s trust in the device that they use to access data is proportional
to the sensitivity of the data being accessed.
Given an adversary with these capabilities, an attacker may attempt to interfere with
the operation of the file system by adding, modifying, or erasing file metadata or data on
the master or storage servers. The attacker may further interfere by attempting to mislead
clients or pose as an additional client to make unauthorized changes to the state of the file
system. On a client system, data is already available in plaintext, so the role of the adversary
is reduced. A client adversary focuses its attack on gaining unauthorized access to data or
obtaining unauthorized access to the master. MooseGuard assumes that operations received
from an authenticated and authorized client are intended, so a compromised client system
may alter the file system state as much as that client’s access allows.
MooseGuard’s security objectve considers several factors in light of such an adversary.
First, MooseGuard seeks to prevent any unauthorized access or manipulation of file data
and metadata. The integrity of this information is also protected by detecting unauthorized
modification both at rest and in transit. MooseGuard aims to further secure the file system
by restricting access to only authenticated and authorized clients and enforce file permissions
for each user. The next objective of MooseGuard is to enforce fork-consistency [37] of file
data so that users cannot view or modify file data more recent than the data available
at the time access was revoked. MooseGuard maintains the integrity of the file system’s
directory structure, but the structure may be visible to the adversary by observing access
patterns. Confidentiality of the directory structure could be provided by implementing an
ORAM [16] technique on directory structure accesses, but this approach is left for future
work. MooseGuard protects the consistency of the file system’s metadata state by ensuring
that the order of operations cannot be altered, but does not consider rollback attacks that
perform a wholesale restoration of file system metadata state to an earlier version. Finally,
MooseGuard assumes the service provider will attempt to provide general availability of the
master and storage service. Denial of service attacks, enclave side-channel attacks [24, 57, 25],
and hardware-based attacks on an SGX-based CPU are not considered.
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2.2 TRUSTED EXECUTION ENVIRONMENTS (TEEs)
Trusted execution environments (TEEs) are secure regions of hardware that provide a
platform to execute code with strengthened confidentiality and integrity. By securing an area
of a CPU to perform isolated execution, TEEs can reduce the attack surface of an application
down to the physical CPU package and reduce the level of trust required to run a sensitive
application on an otherwise insecure platform. TEEs such as Intel SGX [39] and ARM
TrustZone [1] have become increasingly available for both consumer and enterprise markets
[11]. TEEs have several models in which they can be deployed on servers and clients, making
them useful for a wide range of applications. Service providers can provision TEEs on remote
servers or on client devices to accomplish Digital Rights Management. Alternatively, clients
can utilize TEEs present on a service provider’s platform to perform secure computation in
a multitenancy environment. MooseGuard’s design includes both client and server model
deployments of TEEs.
2.2.1 Intel SGX
Intel SGX is a feature in modern Intel CPUs that provides three principal functions of
a TEE: isolated execution, attestation, and sealed storage. Together these features provide
a way to develop applications that are both secure and powerful. The following sections
provide a more detailed background on the functionality of these SGX features.
2.2.1.1 Isolated Execution SGX provides isolated execution through enclaves. En-
claves are shared libraries implemented with fixed entry and exit points, ECALLs and
OCALLs. Enclaves achieve isolated execution by securing the CPU instructions and mem-
ory used while executing the code within an enclave. The Enclave Page Cache (EPC) is a
physical segment of memory claimed by the CPU and dedicated to enclave use. Data bound
for the EPC is encrypted by the CPU’s memory controller. Isolated execution of instructions
is accomplished by a new SGX CPU instruction, which switches the CPU into a secure mode
and jumps to one of the enclave’s well-defined entry points. While in this secure mode, the
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CPU can only execute instructions loaded into the EPC. As a result, the enclave code must
exit the enclave before the application can execute typical system calls. Similarly, interrupts
sent while in the secure mode must save enclave context and exit the enclave before handling
the interrupt.
2.2.1.2 Attestation Attestation allows users to establish trust with enclaves created in
local or remote environments. SGX embeds unique keys in each SGX-enabled CPU and
uses a new SGX instruction, which computes a quote of the enclave. SGX defines a quote
as a secure signature of the enclave’s EPC with this identifying key. Attestation is the
process that users follow to challenge an enclave to prove that it is genuine and that its
integrity is intact. In local attestation, users can confirm the authenticity of a local enclave
and establish a shared key for secure communication to the enclave. Remote attestation
additionally enables a user to confirm the authenticity of an enclave on a remote system by
leveraging the Intel Attestation Service (IAS). The IAS receives enclave quotes and confirms
that the quote was created by a genuine SGX enclave.
2.2.1.3 Sealed Storage Enclaves can only be useful if sensitive data can be passed in
or out. The enclave interface and secure channels established during attestation provide a
mechanism to exchange sensitive data, but these channels are ephemeral. In addition to these
mechanisms, SGX provides the ability to seal and unseal enclave data. Sealing generates
a key that is unique to the enclave implementation and specific CPU where sealing was
invoked. This key allows an enclave to persistently store data on a local untrusted device.
2.2.1.4 Limitations Developing with SGX presents limitations that can impact the de-
sign of an application. Enclaves are limited in the number of system resources they can
use and by how much they can trust the resources they are provided. Specifically, SGX
only offers a non-configurable 128 MB of memory for the EPC shared on all enclaves on a
system. Any additional memory used by an enclave must encrypt pages and evict them into
unprotected memory. Additionally, enclaves are limited to a static number of threads and
must encrypt the enclave’s state during context switches, increasing the cost of transitions
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around ECALLs and OCALLs. It is also up to the application developer to protect their
application from side-channel attacks against SGX applications.
2.3 DISTRIBUTED FILE SYSTEMS
This section provides a brief background on distributed file systems. Specifically, Section
2.3.1 reviews the properties of DFSes that are impacted by the design of MooseGuard.
Section 2.3.2 provides a detailed background on MooseFS, through which MooseGuard’s
prototype is implemented.
2.3.1 Distributed File System Properties
Fundamental properties of a distributed file system include access transparency, location
transparency, and concurrency control [46]. Access transparency in a DFS provides consistent
file data access for a user whether the data is local or remote. Location transparency enables
the decoupling of file metadata and data so that data can be stored remotely at scale.
Concurrency control allows multiple users to operate on data in the file system in parallel
while all clients maintain a consistent view of the file system state. Location transparency
and concurrency control are typically accomplished with a master server (or name server).
Clients will consult the master server to locate and serialize access to files, and provide
access transparency by presenting a uniform interface to clients and resolving remote requests
through that interface.
2.3.2 MooseFS
MooseGuard’s design is intended to be implementable on a DFS that employs a master
server to handle location transparency and concurrency control and where clients access
distributed file data. This paper implements MooseGuard enclaves on top of MooseFS [9], a
general-purpose and open-source DFS. MooseFS is a practical, established, and stable DFS
that supports many use cases and can be deployed on shared infrastructure in cloud or data
9
center environments. MooseFS’s design is spread across a master metadata server, chunk
servers for storage, and clients that interact with both server types. This approach is similar
to approaches taken by the Google File System [30], Lustre [7], and Ceph [58]. MooseFS
demonstrates the typical properties of a DFS, so implementations of MooseGuard on other
DFSes should be able to follow patterns established by the prototype.
2.3.2.1 Master Server MooseFS uses a master server to store file metadata, synchronize
client file access, map file names to chunk servers, and manage deployed chunk servers.
The master server is implemented as a single-threaded userspace daemon process. All file
metadata in the file system is stored in memory. This approach allows for a simple master
server implementation while keeping the master fast enough to serve a large number of clients
and chunk servers. The open-source implementation of MooseFS persists file metadata to
local storage on the master server and replicates that persisted file to designated metadata
logger daemons on remote servers for redundant backups. MooseFS offers a paid ”pro”
version of their software, which supports hot-standby backup master servers. Additionally,
Yu et al. implement a distributed metadata server architecture [59]. Our implementation of
MooseFS uses the open-source, single master server implementation of MooseFS.
2.3.2.2 Chunk Servers MooseFS chunk servers store and replicate file data in the file
system. Chunk servers are implemented as a multi-threaded userspace daemon process.
Chunk servers are intended to be deployed on heterogeneous devices for simple and cost-
efficient scaling of the file system’s raw storage capacity. Each chunk server can locally
optimize checksumming and storing chunks of data on local storage. The master server
manages chunk servers and coordinates replication of chunks, while chunk servers perform
the I/O-bound replication operation between each other. On chunk writes, chunk servers are
provided a list of chunk replica locations from the client, and chunk servers handle the I/O-
bound replication of a write before acknowledging the write to clients. MooseFS supports
at least 100 chunk servers and up to 16,384 petabytes of data.
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2.3.2.3 Clients MooseFS uses FUSE [56] to present a uniform POSIX file system inter-
face to clients. Client interactions between the master and chunk servers are implemented by
a multi-threaded userspace daemon process. The MooseFS client leverages several buffers:
the system page buffers, FUSE synchronous and asynchronous buffers, and MooseFS client
caches for directory entries, file attributes, and chunk locations. Clients communicate with
the master server for all metadata operations and chunk lookup operations, and communicate
directly with chunk servers for chunk read and writes.
2.4 RELATED WORK
2.4.1 TEEs
NeXUS [27] achieves practical secure file sharing for users by implementing a file system
within a client-side enclave and uses the cloud to store and share data. NeXUS maintains
efficient access revocation and wide compatibility with distributed storage by only using
client-side enclaves, with limited scaling of file system metadata. Pesos [35] implements a
secure object store with rich policies to control and audit access. Their approach utilizes
server-side enclaves and specialized Kinetic disks for deployment in untrusted environments.
MooseGuard’s approach examines the trade-off between convenience and scale, utilizing both
client and server enclaves. This approach enables greater scale in data and metadata storage
and in concurrent use. Other SGX research in data storage considers stricter privacy by
preventing Iago attacks [51], using ORAM techniques in file access [16], and other forms of
data management such as securing a DBMS in an untrusted environment [44].
TEEs have also been used in a wide range of use cases. Many efforts have explored
providing a secure virtual system to deploy applications on insecure platforms [21, 55, 19,
54, 50]. Applications for secure data processing in the cloud have been built, including
machine learning and analytics [48, 47] and secure messaging [18, 34]. Research has found
vulnerabilities, particularly through side-channel attacks, in the implementation of SGX [24,
57, 25]; there have also been efforts to mitigate these flaws [26, 49, 41]. Several papers have
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proposed ways to optimize or provide enhanced features to SGX, specifically through better
memory management [38, 53] or by avoiding enclave exits [42]. Finally, various techniques
have been examined to enable more secure application development within TEEs with stricter
integrity checking [20, 36, 23, 43].
2.4.2 File Systems
Distributed file systems research has seen growth from original principals of a DFS [45, 10]
into highly scaled and specialized deployments that focus on high throughput, parallelism,
or size in specific applications [30, 58, 7, 52, 28]. MooseGuard considers the fundamental
features of a DFS so that its design applies to many of these systems. Cryptographic file
systems research has previously explored locally encrypting files, which typically aims to
secure the file system against other non-privileged users and assumes trust in the host OS
[22, 29]. Research focused on providing stricter security in DFSes for untrusted environments
has focused on encryption at the client-side [31, 33, 40]. These efforts are limited by expensive
access revocation or complex key management. MooseGuard’s use of TEEs enables both
improved security and efficiency.
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3.0 MOOSEGUARD
MooseGuard is an approach towards securing a distributed file system so that the file
system is capable of being deployed in an untrusted environment. The modifications that
MooseGuard propose leverage SGX enclaves on both clients and on a master server within a
DFS. Enclaves specialized to handle metadata and data operations allow a DFS to operate
at scale while protecting the confidentiality and integrity of a user’s data and metadata.
MooseGuard identifies three general components of a DFS that need to be extended to sup-
port its goal of a secure file system on an untrusted platform. These components are isolated
execution of sensitive metadata operations on a master server, enhanced authentication and
authorization of users, and isolated execution of file encryption and decryption on clients.
The following sections of this chapter describe the design and implementation of Moose-
Guard used to extend MooseFS. Figure 2 depicts the components surrounding MooseGuard
and how they interact. Isolated execution on the master is accomplished by the Server
Enclave and described in Section 3.1. Enhanced authentication and authorization of users
between clients and the master server utilizes SGX’s attestation properties and is detailed in
Section 3.2. Trusted file encryption and access control enforcement is performed on clients
via the Client Encalve and is described in Section 3.3. Table 1 lists all of the keys and other
encryption metadata introduced by MooseGuard, grouped by each component in which they
are used. The utilization of each value is described in the following sections.
3.1 MASTER SERVER
Many distributed file systems employ the use of a master server to centralize and syn-
chronize client operations and to act as a name server to locate chunks of data on other
servers. Deploying a master server on an untrusted platform can threaten the security of
a client’s sensitive information stored on the system. An untrusted or vulnerable service
provider can read, modify, or erase file metadata and present false locations as a way to pass
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Figure 2: MooseGuard Architecture. Greyed boxes represent MooseGuard extensions to
MooseFS, bold boundaries highlight components of MooseFS and MooseGuard, and dashed
lines indicate encrypted data in transit.
Table 1: MooseGuard Encryption Metadata
Symbol Type Description
Key Usage
Master Enclave Client Client Enclave
Kr AES-GCM 128 bit Metadata Cache Sealing Y N N
Kc AES-GCM 128 bit Metadata Changelog Sealing Y N N
Km AES-CTR 128 bit Metadata Backup Sealing Y N N
Kf AES-GCM 128 bit File Encryption Key Y N Y
H iint SHA-256 File Chunk Hash Versioning
Y N Y
H iext N Y Y
T ij AES-GCM 128 bit File Encryption Autenticated Data N Y Y
Ku ECDSA-256 User Access Permission
Y N N
K−1u N Y Y
Kr AES-GCM 128 bit Client ↔ Master Secure Channel Y N Y
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false file data to clients. However, the use of a master server also provides greater scalability
of both a DFS’s total storage and metadata sizes.
MooseGuard enables a DFS to utilize a master server while addressing the security
concerns of an untrusted platform by performing sensitive operations in a server enclave.
Additionally, MooseGuard supports scaled metadata sizes regardless of a TEE’s memory
limitations by implementing a caching layer for metadata. Finally, the master server can
persistently store metadata backups by utilizing the sealing functionality of a TEE. Together,
these functionalities secure the master server functionalities enabling the deployment of a
DFS for secure use in an untrusted environment.
3.1.1 Master Enclave
MooseFS’s master server coordinates changes to the state of a file system, manages chunk
servers, chunks, and stores all metadata in RAM for quick access. MooseGuard partitions
the work of the master server into trusted and untrusted operations. This approach separates
the secure policy decisions of the file system from the underlying server mechanisms that the
service provider is responsible for maintaining. Partitioning the master server functionality
reduces the TCB of file system policy decisions that must be kept secure. By removing the
untrusted operations from the TCB, the scalability of the file system increases as it allows
the service provider to manage raw storage and networking at large scale.
Trusted operations include attesting and establishing secure communication with clients,
coordinating file system state changes (operations on metadata), and sealing and unsealing
metadata stored in untrusted spaces on the master server. Untrusted operations include
managing chunks and chunk servers, persisting reliably to disk, and all network communica-
tions. The master enclave defines the boundary between trusted and untrusted operations
as SGX ECALLs and OCALLs. Untrusted code may invoke an ECALL to respond to a
user- or system- driven event that needs to change the file system state. Trusted code may
invoke an OCALL to perform a system call in response to an ECALL and trusted processing.
Implementing MooseGuard with a different file system, or creating master server logic from
scratch with SGX enclaves in mind would yield a different number of ECALLs and OCALLs.
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However, any implementation will have similar categories of operations.
Although the interface of the master server’s trusted operations is reduced to well-defined
entry points, an attacker could still modify the integrity of the file system’s state by invoking
ECALLs in an unexpected order, or with unexpected inputs. Unexpected inputs are con-
sidered during ECALL transitions with parameter checking implemented by SGX’s SDK.
MooseGuard protects against the issue of unexpected ECALL ordering by grouping ECALLs
into phases. During each phase, ECALLs from other phases are rejected. The first phase
is an initialization phase where the enclave is created and persisted metadata is unsealed
into the enclave. The second phase allows new users to connect, attest, and issue file system
operations through a secure channel. During this phase, only the ECALLs to receive client
attestation and file operation messages are enabled. The final phase halts the file system,
sealing new versions of metadata and terminating the enclave.
3.1.2 Metadata Cache
DFSes may need to utilize much more memory than a TEE can provide. Specifically,
MooseFS stores all of the file system’s metadata in memory for quick access. This can be
several gigabytes in size, but the SGX EPC is much smaller. The default SGX implemen-
tation provides a workaround where enclave memory can be paged out by encrypting and
evicting pages to untrusted memory, but this can be up to 35x slower than typical random
memory accesses as the eviction process must access a special memory encryption engine
[53]. MooseGuard takes an alternative approach by using untrusted memory as the backing
store of metadata objects and implementing a cache for these objects within the server en-
clave. The cache encrypts all metadata objects before evicting objects to untrusted memory.
This approach allows the master enclave to define when encryption-based paging occurs and
optimize the cache based on access patterns of metadata instead of memory access patterns.
MooseGuard’s implementation leverages the SGX SDK sealing APIs to derive a key to seal
evicted metadata objects, Kr from Table 1. Each object is encrypted using AES-GCM 128-
bit encryption, and encrypted data is authenticated using AEAD. Since Kr is only used
to encrypt non-persistent data, this key is ephemeral and only used for the lifetime of the
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enclave.
A DFS implementing this approach with MooseGuard should cache enough metadata to
prevent the thrashing of metadata objects for a single client operation. The cache imple-
mentation for MooseGuard on MooseFS uses as much free enclave memory as possible to
improve the performance of repeated and predictable file system operations. This enables
MooseGuard’s server enclave to traverse an entire directory path for operations such as the
POSIX extension readdirplus. The implementation of this cache is a simple, 60 MB LRU
write-through cache. This cache is large enough to hold approximately 200,000 MooseFS
metadata objects which may include file names, inodes, and symlink information. This im-
plementation holds a working set large enough to satisfy large workloads, and its performance
is measured in Section 5.2.2; further optimization of this cache is left for future improvement.
3.1.3 Persistent Metadata
Saving metadata to disk is an important requirement for the master server of any DFS.
MooseGuard considers this functionality and utilizes the sealing capability of a TEE to
accomplish this. In MooseFS’s implementation of saving metadata, the master server logs
each file system operation in a changelog on-demand and compacts changelogs into binary
checkpoints of the file system metadata on an interval (by default every hour for MooseFS).
The master server uses SGX sealing capabilities to derive enclave-specific keys, Kc, Km shown
on Table 1, to encrypt data to be written to disk. Each changelog message is encrypted using
Kc and authenticated individually, and each stores the metadata epoch counter inside the
message. Each changelog message is additionally chained to the previous message by using
the associated data from AES-GCM encryption as additional data for the next encryption
call. The binary checkpoint file contains all of the metadata in a single encrypted and
authenticated file along with the metadata epoch. Each changelog message is encrypted
with 128-bit AES-GCM encryption, and the checkpoint file is encrypted with 128-bit AES-
CTR encryption and authenticated with HMAC-256.
With this approach, the file system’s state can be restored into an enclave with the same
signature. Given the same enclave signature and sealed data, the server enclave can derive
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Kc and Km. This allows the service to close down and be restored in the event of a failure.
Because all file and directory metadata is sealed as one checkpoint file, this approach does
not leave the file system vulnerable to rollback attacks at a file or directory granularity,
but only at the epoch counter granularity. A secure hash of file chunks, H iint, is stored
alongside file metadata in the checkpoint file. An attacker cannot restore the file system
to an older metadata epoch to gain access to a newer version of file data. This is because
checks on an older value H iint would fail during decryption. The details of this check are
explained in detail in Section 3.3.3. Attempting to rollback a specific change in a changelog
would be detected with integrity checks since each changelog message is chained together
when encrypted. Similarly, modifying the binary, which stores metadata, is detected through
authenticated decryption. Overall, an adversary may leverage rollback attacks to restore the
file system to an older snapshot, but the integrity of the file system and the access set during
that snapshot do not allow a user to access new data with an older metadata epoch.
3.2 SECURE COMMUNICATION
Authorized and authenticated access is common in modern DFSes, however typical DFS
usage assumes that clients and servers faithfully provide correct access control when creden-
tials are provided and protocols are followed. In an untrusted setting, the service provider can
collude to circumvent authorized access to the master server by manipulating network traffic
or altering the system that hosts the master. Additonally, a client’s system can attempt
to use invalid credentials or exploit an authentication process on an untrusted platform to
avoid access control.
MooseGuard fortifies existing authorized and authenticated access by establishing secure
channels of communication between clients and the master server to protect the privacy and
integrity of operations on the file system. Given the stricter threat model, clients and the
master server must verify that the other will perform file system operations securely and as
intended. In addition to ensuring that operations that require permission are evaluated in
a TEE, as discussed in Sections 3.1 and 3.3, MooseGuard leverages the attestation feature
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of Intel SGX between client enclaves and the master enclave to ensure that enclaves will
faithfully execute permission checks. Furthermore, after establishing a connection to the
master server, clients must only be able to access what they are granted permission to, as
opposed to any arbitrary client issuing arbitrary operations on the master. To accomplish
this, MooseGuard requires a public/private key-pair used by a user to authorize an action.
3.2.1 Attestation
The SGX Remote Attestation Protocol [17] establishes a secure communication channel
between master and client enclaves. This process is an extended Sigma protocol to conduct a
Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange. Remote Attestation establishes several key facts: the identity
of the client and master enclaves, the integrity of those enclaves, the authenticity of the
platform each enclave is running on, and finally a shared key that can be used to derive keys
for secure end-to-end encryption between enclaves. Both endpoints for this secure channel
are established within enclaves, which makes this channel suitable for the master and client
to share keys for file encryption and for the master to associate this channel instance with
a set of UNIX file permissions. Thus, establishing a secure channel is a key requirement
for MooseGuard to provide authenticated and authorized access to a DFS in untrusted
environments.
Both client enclaves and the master enclave must prove their authenticity to each other.
As a result, MooseGuard performs the attestation process twice. The process begins with
a typical ECDH key exchange which establishes the shared key, Kr (Table 1), between the
master and client enclaves. From this step onward, all communication between enclaves is
encrypted with Kr using AES-GCM 128-bit encryption. Next, the master enclave challenges
the client enclave to provide a quote. This quote is received by the master enclave and sent
to the Intel Attestation Service (IAS). After the quote is validated, the master server has
established the identity and integrity of the client enclave and its SGX-enabled CPU. The
client has now established a trustworthy place to perform isolated execution, but must still
prove to the master that it is authorized to share file encryption keys (FEKs) and accept
file operation requests. Finally, the client enclave issues the same challenge and the master
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replies with a quote. The quote is validated, and the client enclave can trust the identity
and authenticity of the master server it is connected to.
3.2.2 User Authentication and Permissions
After the attestation process, both enclaves have established a trusted platform to operate
on, but have not established that the client who initiated the connection has permissions to
operate on the file system. In a typical DFS, after a client connection has been established,
the client will provide credentials to authorize itself on the file system. MooseGuard extends
this step by requiring clients to provide a credential that can be verified within the master
enclave. This process restricts access to only client enclaves that are granted permission to
use the file system, restricts each client connection to act as only a single user, and allows
the master server to identify what permissions each connected client has within its isolated
execution environment.
MooseGuard ensures that only authorized users access the file system by requiring each
user to authenticate their access with a public/private key pair, Ku|K−1u from Table 1. The
master server has a whitelist of all authorized users’ public keys, and a mapping of UNIX
user IDs to public keys f : u → Ku. These keys ensure that only authorized users can
access the file system, and allows the master server to validate the authorization of a user
within its enclave. Each client knows their private key K−1u , and the ID of the user they
wish to authenticate as. The client enclave signs the user ID with their private key and
sends this signature to the master enclave. The master enclave validates the signature and
associates the validated UNIX ID with the current secure channel. The master enclave maps
all file system operations on this secure channel to the established UNIX ID. This process
further restricts each client’s connection to operate as a single, authenticated user. If a client
attempts to authenticate as a different user with their private key by signing a different UNIX
ID, the master will detect this violation during the verification of the signature.
The public/private key pair is the mechanism that allows the master enclave to authen-
ticate users. Associating each key pair with a UNIX ID provides convenience for clients
to interact natively with the FUSE mount. Further, it allows the MooseFS master server’s
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implementation of access control, performed in the master enclave, to remain unmodified.
Finally, after the client and client enclave authorize themselves with the master server, the
secure channel can be used to issue file system operations, and the client enclave can be used
to access encrypted file data from chunk servers.
3.3 CLIENTS
DFSes implement functionality on clients to combine the task of locating data with the
master and accessing data on chunk servers into a coherent client-side interface for users of
the file system. Whether the implementation of the client runs in privileged or unprivileged
modes on the CPU, a client can evade access control for file data by directly accessing
chunk servers instead of using the client interface. A DFS can address this vulnerability by
encrypting chunks and only sharing keys with clients after an access check on the master
server. However, even with a master server running in a TEE this incurs expensive re-
encryption costs when access is revoked. The DFS could instead perform all encryption
directly on the master and send decrypted file data to clients through a secure channel, but
this approach would severely bottleneck the scalability of read and write throughput at the
master server. Finally, a DFS could enforce access control on chunk servers or through a
third party, but the management of keys and other metadata would limit the scalability and
expand the attack surface for the DFS.
MooseGuard’s solution to this issue utilizes a TEE on each client, where file encryption
keys can be shared, utilized, and revoked in a trusted, isolated environment on the client.
This approach enables the master to distribute work to the client for both enforcing access
to files and encrypting files for I/O. Distributing the work of encryption and decryption
to the client allows users to operate on data in parallel and simplifies the chunk server
requirements. This allows the service provider to easily scale-out storage with no major
changes to the chunk server implementation. This section describes the organization of
the client enclave, additional file encryption metadata MooseGuard introduces, and the
distributed access control procedure that MooseGuard proposes.
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3.3.1 Client Enclave
The client functionality of a DFS can combine intricate caching and optimization, but at
its core, it must communicate with the master to retrieve chunk metadata and communicate
with chunk servers for file I/O. MooseGuard proposes a simple client enclave inserted in
between client functionality and network interactions with remote servers in the DFS. This
allows the client enclave to intercept master messages to send and receive additional encryp-
tion metadata, and intercept file I/O and perform encryption in-line between the client and
chunk servers.
With its limited responsibilities, MooseGuard’s implementation of a client enclave on
MooseFS is much simpler than the master enclave. The client enclave interface includes
ECALLs to connect and attest to the master, send messages to the master over the secure
channel, and encrypt and decrypt blocks of data from a chunk server. Like the master
enclave, the client enclave utilizes the SGX SDK’s generated boundary checks but does not
implement any further prevention of Iago attacks.
3.3.2 File Encryption Scheme
Data servers in DFSes distribute files or chunks over multiple storage servers for redun-
dancy, concurrency, and heterogeneous support. Specificially, MooseFS divides file data into
64 MB chunks as a unit of replication between chunk servers, and further divides each chunk
into a collection of 64 KB blocks as a common unit for accessing data and computing check-
sums for data integrity. Clients can obtain read and write locks at a chunk granularity for
each file. MooseGuard’s implementation on MooseFS chooses to encrypt data and compute
secure checksums on the same block-alignments to balance the trade-off of storing additional
associated encryption data with block-aligned data access that MooseFS generally optimizes
for. MooseGuard’s general approach of assigning a file encryption key (FEK) to each file and
storing a hashed version of the file generalizes its approach, making it adaptable to different
divisions of data for each DFS implementation.
MooseGuard implemented on MooseFS extends the file inode structure on the master to
store Kf (Table 1), a 128-bit FEK, and H
i
int, an array of 256-bit chunk hashes for each chunk
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Figure 3: MooseGuard File Extensions
i, stored alongside the chunk map for each file. Each block within a chunk is encrypted with
Kf and a random IV using AES-GCM 128-bit encryption producing authenticated data AD.
For each block j in chunk i, the pair of associated encryption data IV and AD is stored
together as the value T ij := IV |AD in the extended header for a 64 MB chunk. On updates,
the chunk header is hashed using SHA-256 hashing to determine the new version of chunk i.
Formally, H i := SHA256(T i1|...|T i1024). During access control, as described in Section 3.3.3,
the external and internal versions of the H i are compared. Figure 3 depicts how encryption
metadata is organized in the inodes and chunk metadata.
3.3.2.1 Chunk Server Modifications The chunk server does not require an enclave;
however, the implementation of MooseGuard on MooseFS required slight modifications to
the MooseFS chunk server daemon to support the storage of additional encryption metadata
for each chunk. The first change was to store encryption metadata alongside other chunk
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metadata. The second change was to modify the messages between clients and chunk servers
to read and write encryption metadata, and between chunk servers to replicate the encryption
metadata. The messages were extended so clients could store each chunk’s T ij values on
the chunk server. These changes were trivial for MooseFS and should not affect a service
provider’s ability to deploy the chunk server daemon.
3.3.3 File Access Control and Revocation
MooseGuard clients access file data in two phases. The first phase is a common behavior
for both read and write access. The client first requests access to chunk i on file f from
the master. After the master validates the client’s access, it returns all necessary metadata
required to access the chunk. This metadata includes Kf , H
i
int, and the location of the
chunk. The client enclave strips Kf and H
i
int and caches them inside the enclave for the
pending chunk server access, while the location is returned to the client.
Figure 4 depicts how a client reads a chunk in both phases. During phase two of a chunk
read, the client requests block j and all block headers T i1, ..., T
i
1024 from the chunk server.
Then the client enclave computes H iext := SHA256(T
i
1|...|T i1024) and checks that H iext = H iint
to confirm that the version of the chunk the client is decrypting matches the version of the
chunk they have access to decrypt. Finally, block j is decrypted with Kf from phase one
and T ij and returned to the client.
Similarly, Figure 5 depicts how a client writes a chunk in both phases. Write access checks
and encryption use the same concept as reads of checking the internal and external hash
versions, but need to commit a new hash to finalize the write. During phase two of a chunk
write, the client requests all block headers T i1, ..., T
i
1024 from the chunk server (this step is
optimized through caching). Then the client enclave computes H iext := SHA256(T
i
1|...|T i1024)
and checks that H iext = H
i
int to confirm that the version of the chunk the client is about
to encrypt matches the version of the chunk they have access to encrypt. Next, the client
enclave encrypts block j using Kf from phase one and T
i
j and updates the internal hash
H iint := SHA256(T
i
1|...|T ij |...|T i1024). The client enclave writes the new encrypted block and
header to the chunk server and finally commits the newly written version of the chunk to
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Figure 4: MooseGuard Read Access Control
the master enclave by returning the new value of H iint. When the master commits the new
version of the chunk, the write access is confirmed in the master enclave one more time.
In the most basic implementation, the overhead MooseGuard imposes over MooseFS is
reading the entire chunk header, validating H i through a SHA-256 hash, and encrypting or
decrypting with AES-GCM 128-bit. The IVs and ADs for each chunk require 28 KB of space
and each block is 64 KB. Thus, the worst case overhead for any read or write is the cost
an additional 28 KB read from the chunk server, combined with the costs of hashing 28 KB
and encrypting 64 KB. This cost can be mitigated by combining encryption or decryption
of multiple blocks in one block access. Additionally, the MooseGuard implementation on
MooseFS utilizes extra enclave memory to cache as many encryption headers T i1, ..., T
i
1024
as possible, preventing multiple 28 KB header reads from the chunk server on each chunk
operation. When a client frequently works on the latest version of this file, the cost of
reading the whole header is heavily mitigated. The impact of this overhead and the benefits
of caching are shown in the file I/O access pattern benchmark in the evaluation at Section
5.1.2.
MooseGuard can revoke access to file metadata immediately as the master server handles
a request. However, when access to a file’s data is changed through UNIX file permissions,
access to file data from each client is revoked lazily as the client enclave detects a change in
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Figure 5: MooseGuard Write Access Control
the chunk hash H iint! = H
i
ext. This approach could allow a service provider to collude with
a client that had access revoked, allowing the client to continue accessing an older version
of a file. MooseGuard views this as an acceptable vulnerability as users typically anticipate
that data shared with another user can be copied to a separate location.
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4.0 SECURITY ANALYSIS
MooseGuard’s goal is to enable a secure distributed file system that can be deployed
in untrusted environments. MooseGuard considers a powerful adversary amongst a server
architecture deployed on an untrusted platform with client devices that attempt to gain
unauthorized access to data. In the context of the deployment and threat models defined in
Chapter 2, this chapter discusses MooseGuard’s design and how it accomplishes its security
goals. This chapter considers the confidentiality and integrity guarantees on user data, how
MooseGuard prevents unauthorized access, and finally how the state of the file system is
kept consistent in the presence of a strong adversary.
4.1 CONFIDENTIALITY AND INTEGRITY
MooseGuard identifies several categories of information in a DFS that are sensitive and
must be protected. The sensitive information that MooseGuard protects is file data, file
metadata, and messages between the master and client enclaves. Table 1 summarizes the
three categories of data that MooseGuard protects, and the keys and encryption methods
used for each data type. All information that MooseGuard protects is encrypted using
AEAD encryption algorithms to ensure confidentiality and integrity. Except for a user’s key
(Ku), all keys originate from isolated execution within a TEE. All encryption operations are
executed only within a validated enclave, and key sharing between enclaves (Kf and H
i
int)
is done between authenticated and authorized enclaves over a secure channel.
4.2 AUTHORIZED ACCESS
MooseGuard ensures that only authorized users of the file system can read or change
the state of the file system. MooseGuard identifies three areas where authorization must
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be confirmed before operating on the file system. The remainder of this section details the
steps MooseGuard takes to ensure unauthorized access to the file system is prevented.
4.2.1 Authorizing User Access
Users of MooseGuard must follow several steps to gain authorized access to the file
system. Client enclaves first use a Diffie-Hellman key exchange to establish Kr and a secure
communication channel. The master and client enclaves then prove the authenticity and
integrity of the other’s enclave using remote attestation with the IAS. The client enclave
then binds it’s UNIX ID and groups to the secure channel by signing its ID with K−1u ,
provided by the user, and sends this to the master. The master enclave verifies this access
with Ku, which is hardcoded into the enclave. At this point, the user has established a
secure channel to communicate, proven the authenticity and integrity of its enclave, and
proven they are authorized to access the system.
4.2.2 Securing the Enclave Boundary
The master server enclave mitigates unauthorized manipulation of the file system by only
making ECALLs available during phases of operation. Because the master enclave executes in
a single-threaded environment, incorrect ordering of OCALLs can simply be checked with the
SGX SDKs generated boundary code. During the initialization phase, ECALLs are expected
to be called in an exact sequence that initializes the enclave, restores the sealed metadata
snapshot (with Km), and replays changelogs after the metadata snapshot version (with Kc).
During the main phase of operation, the only entrances to the enclave are through ECALLs
for new or existing client communication. New clients follow an exact sequence of attestation
ECALLs, and all existing client messages are sent through the same ECALL. These well-
defined steps allow the enclave to decrypt the message in each ECALL and verify that the
ECALL was called in the correct sequence. OCALLs to commit changelog entries, access
the metadata cache, and make chunk changes are all executed serially through OCALLs
during the initial ECALL. Finally, the shutdown phase is restricted to the single ECALL
to initiate sealing metadata. All other operations to store metadata are completed through
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serial OCALLs until the process completes. Additional hardening of enclave boundaries to
prevent further attacks, such as Iago attacks, could be pursued by implementing a solution
similar to the work by Shinde et al. [50, 51]; this is left for future work.
4.2.3 File Access and Revocation
The client enclave interface is considerably simpler. The client enclave interface contains
sequenced ECALLs to attest and authorize with the master and contains ECALLs used to
send metadata operations or encrypt or decrypt file data. ECALLs for metadata messages
and file access may be called in any order, but MooseGuard will only return decrypted data or
commit newly encrypted data when the client enclave follows the protocol detailed in Section
3.3.3 to gain authorized access to files. Access revocation is checked at the master enclave
when a user requests access to a file and is enforced at the client enclave by checking that




A DFS provides basic consistency guarantees by ensuring that state changes in the file
system are committed to disk and that concurrent client operations are properly serialized.
In light of the threat model in Section 2.1, MooseGuard further protects the consistency of
the file system from an adversary that may attempt to create an inconsistent state in the file
system. Specifically, MooseGuard ensures fork consistency on access revocation. Formally,
when a user’s access of a file is revoked at version vf , the user may be able to read copies of
the file at versions v for all versions v < vf , but the user will not be able to read copies of
the file at versions v′ for all versions v′ ≥ vf .
Another area of MooseGuard that is vulnerable to attacks on consistency is metadata
stored outside of the master enclave. Confidentiality and integrity for metadata is addressed
in Section 4.1. However, attackers may try to reorder or remove pieces of persistent metadata.
An attacker may try to swap encrypted objects in the metadata cache. MooseGuard detects
29
such an attack by embedding the ID of the cache entry in the metadata object before sealing
it. When unsealing the entry, MooseGuard asserts that the expected ID matches the un-
sealed ID. MooseGuard also considers attacks on the ordering of persistent metadata. When
MooseGuard unseals and replays the changelog to initialize the file system, an attacker may
reorder encrypted lines in the changelog. MooseGuard detects this attack during unsealing,
as each changelog entry is chained together. As an example, given changelog entry Ci and as-
sociated data ADi−1, MooseGuard will perform the encryption ENC(Ci|ADi−1)→ Ei, ADi,
which produces encrypted data Ei and associated data ADi. During unsealing, swapped
changelogs will break this chaining and authenticated decryption will detect the violation.
Finally, an attacker could choose to omit changelog entries at the end of the chain
or perform a wholesale swap of a compacted metadata backup. These rollback attacks
put MooseGuard into an old state, but not an inconsistent state. Work to detect rollback
attacks on the persistent metadata files could be accomplished by embedding counters using
a hardware counter with the SGX SDK or by using an approach similar to ROTE [36]; this
is currently unexplored in this paper and left for future improvement.
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5.0 EVALUATION
MooseGuard’s evaluation considers the performance impact that it imposes on a dis-
tributed file system. The performance impact is measured by comparing the latency over-
head of file system operations on a stock MooseFS file system versus a MooseGuard file
system. The costs of encryption, additional verification in chunk access, and master perfor-
mance in a TEE are examined in the context of file I/O benchmarks, metadata benchmarks,
and various applications.
The prototype implementation of MooseGuard was built with Intel’s SGX SDK v2.7.1,
SGX driver v2.6 and MooseFS v3.0.99. The TCB of the compiled server enclave was 2.9
MB, and the client enclave was 1.4 MB. Using SLOCCount [12] to count lines of code,
MooseGuard’s implementation added 20,907 new lines, of which 10,002 were lines generated
by the SGX SDK enclave interfaces.
MooseGuard was evaluated on a private gigabit network on machines running Ubuntu
18.04. MooseGuard was configured with one master server (Intel Core i7-8700 CPU @
3.20GHz, 16GB RAM), 1-4 clients, and 4 chunk servers with approximately 1 TB of storage
on each server. Chunk replication was set to a factor of 2 and 4 chunk servers were used in
each test. All results shown were averaged over 10 samples.
5.1 FILE I/O BENCHMARKS
The intent of the file I/O benchmarks are to analyze MooseGuard’s impact on file I/O
throughput. MooseGuard implements file encryption on a 64 KB block size and accesses
the master to check file permissions and manage keys on every chunk access. Because of
these requirements of MooseGuard, the evaluation of file I/O considers several elements.
The evaluation looks at performance over varying file sizes, access patterns, and the effect
of multiple clients concurrently operating on files. File I/O performance was measured by
using IOR [6]. IOR uses POSIX C APIs to access files and uses MPI to coordinate reading
and writing to files via clients hosted on multiple remote computers.
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Figure 6: File I/O Overheads over Varying File Sizes
5.1.1 File Sizes
MooseGuard’s client enclave must encrypt all file data and synchronize encryption meta-
data with the master enclave. The file size evaluation isolates the cost of encrypting file data
in MooseGuard. This test is run through a single client that reads and writes files sizes of
varying orders of magnitude. All files were read and written sequentially. The Linux page
cache was cleared at the beginning of each read iteration to force all reads through MooseFS
to ensure all data is read and written through our file system. MooseFS was configured to
never cache file data locally on clients. IOR was configured to read and write blocks of data
1 KB at a time, flushing writes before closing each file.
Figure 6 shows that as file size varies, the overhead that MooseGuard introduces remains
constant. Over all file sizes, the overhead for both read and write operations is constant.
MooseFS optimizes for block accesses of 64 KB, so small file accesses can be completed in
one operation for MooseFS. Operating on larger file sizes took more operations and reflected
an average latency with less variance than smaller file operations. These results indicate
that MooseGuard’s client-side encryption introduces a constant overhead per read or write.
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Figure 7: File I/O Performance over Access Patterns
5.1.2 Access Patterns
MooseGuard’s implementation chooses to encrypt data in 64 KB blocks. By encrypting
blocks of data at this size, MooseGuard can balance between performance in accessing smaller
units of data and the storage overhead of encryption metadata per-block. The access pattern
evaluation compares the file I/O performance overhead of MooseGuard in workloads that
vary in how much data is accessed and in the order that data is accessed. This test accesses
a 128 MB file through a single client, flushing writes after every block access and clearing
the Linux page cache before each read.
Figure 7 shows the runtime of each operation in each access mode. Both file systems
improve in performance with 64 KB block size, the default unit of storage for MooseFS. In
sequential reads, both file systems on both block sizes can leverage MooseFS’s read-ahead
and write-coalescing capabilities, and the overheads are minimal as a result. All other access
patterns show that MooseGuard incurs nearly a 2x overhead in 32 KB operations. Each
32 KB operation requires MooseGuard to fetch 64 KB of data for encryption, while stock
MooseFS can access smaller block slices. In 64 KB blocks, this is not a factor, so the overhead
33
Figure 8: File I/O Performance over Client Scale
is reduced substantially to approximately the cost of encryption alone. Overall, the results
of this test show that this approach suits most access patterns with reasonable overhead,
and the performance for specific access patterns can be enhanced by properly adjusting the
block size for encryption.
5.1.3 Client Scaling
The client scaling benchmark evaluates the impact of MooseGuard on file I/O operations
during concurrent use of the file system by many clients. MooseGuard’s approach of man-
aging FEKs with the master enclave but distributing keys to client enclaves for encryption
aims to enable concurrent use of the file system by limiting where the master enclave can
be a bottleneck. This test distributes the work of writing and reading 1 GB of data over
multiple clients. The work is split into 1024 tasks of reads and writes of 1 MB of data each.
IOR was configured to ensure that each client never read data that it also wrote. Writes
were flushed at the close of each file, and the Linux page cache was flushed before reads in
the one node case.
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Figure 8 shows the overall latency of the operation decreases as the number of clients
increases for both file systems. Reads are faster than writes in both cases because writes
require replication of data while reads can access any chunk server. The performance does
not decrease linearly, which may be a result of our chunk servers becoming overwhelmed.
MooseFS typically uses up to 250 threads on clients and on chunk servers to handle file
I/O. During testing, we found that 2 clients can saturate 4 chunk servers with our hardware
setup. To analyze the impact of client scale, the number of worker threads for clients was
reduced to 125 threads for this test.
5.2 METADATA BENCHMARKS
This section of the evaluation focuses on the overhead of metadata operations, which
are impacted by MooseGuard’s enclaves differently than file I/O. All metadata operations
occur only between clients and the master; the client enclave’s file encryption methods are
not used. While there are many types of metadata operations, this section of the evaluation
focuses on three core metadata operations at scale: creating, querying, and deleting a node.
Other typical metadata operations are evaluated in Section 5.3.
This section of the evaluation uses mdtest [6], another HPC file system benchmarking tool
from the LLNL. Like IOR, mdtest uses POSIX C APIs to perform file system operations and
utilizes MPI to coordinate running these operations across many clients on remote computers.
Unlike the file I/O, metadata operations for MooseFS are not as heavily parallelized on
individual clients. To operate on large directory structures, the metadata benchmarks always
distribute the work across four clients unless otherwise noted. Additionally, MooseGuard
caches recently used directories and attributes for up to 1 second. For these tests, those
caches were disabled.
5.2.1 Directory Tree Sizes
MooseGuard’s master enclave protects the integrity of metadata operations but aims
to keep the implementation of metadata management the same where possible. The first
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Figure 9: Metadata Performance over Directory Tree Sizes
metadata benchmark examines the overhead in latency that MooseGuard introduces while
operating on directory structures of various sizes. This test creates a deep directory structure,
then creates, stats, and deletes an equal number of files and directories at each level of the
structure. The total number of files and directories in an iteration of the test ranges from 200
to 20,000 files and directories. All operations were run sequentially using mdtest’s default
behavior.
Figure 9 shows that the overhead of performing these operations ranges between 1x to
1.5x, varying between directory tree sizes. Though the runtime required to perform metadata
operations increases for larger directory trees, all operations on deep trees are performed in-
memory on the master, which prevents linear growth in runtime of deep tree accesses. As
a result, the overhead does not show an increase with various directory tree sizes. Stat
operations generally had less overhead than create or remove operations, suggesting that
the extra memory allocation operations required by the MooseGuard enclave can impact
performance. Overall, this benchmark suggests that MooseGuard does not prohibit large
directory trees in a secure file system.
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Figure 10: Metadata Cache Impact on Performance
5.2.2 Master Metadata Cache
MooseGuard’s implementation of the client enclave has limited memory, so it uses a
cache to store elements of the directory tree in enclave memory. This imposes encryption
costs for nodes evicted from the cache and has an extra cost in general to manage memory
for the cached items. This benchmark compares the overhead of a stat operation from delays
caused by the cache. The test also shows delays caused by entering and leaving enclaves,
which is required for any operation but occurs more frequently with uncached data. This
test creates 5000 files and directories in one flat root directory, then runs the stat operation
on all entries. In the MooseGuard variants of the test, the size of the cache is modified to
hold all entries (MG Seq., Cached), no entries (MG Seq., No Cache), or half of the entries
(MG Random).
Figure 10 shows the runtime of the stat operations in each environment. The cost of
calling stat on a directory node or a file node is approximately the same in any environment.
The overhead of sequentially calling stat for MooseGuard with all cached entries versus stock
MooseFS is 1.034, which is the approximate overhead for encryption costs in the client to
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master secure channel and the cost to enter and exit the client and master enclaves. The
overhead of always missing cached data vs. always hitting cached data in MooseGuard is
1.078, which is the approximate overhead the cache itself imposes. The worst-case overhead
between always missing the cache in MooseGuard and stock is an overhead of 1.115, roughly
the combination of both previous overheads. Randomly hitting the cache shows an overhead
between both scenarios. These results suggest that a TEE with limited memory can support a
secure file system with MooseGuard’s approach by leveraging caching cold metadata outside
the enclave.
5.2.3 Client Scaling
MooseGuard avoids bottlenecks in file I/O by distributing work to clients, but metadata
operations are coordinated by a master server. The client scale benchmark for metadata
examines the impact of MooseGuard on the file system’s ability to scale concurrent metadata
operations to multiple clients. This test distributes the work of creating, stating, and deleting
20,000 files and directories over 1 to 4 clients. All 20,000 nodes are organized in one flat root
directory.
Figure 11 shows the trend of latency to run the operations as the number of concur-
rent clients increases. In general, the latency to perform all operations decreases in both
file systems as more clients work together. The performance starts to flatten between 3
and 4 clients when the single-threaded master server starts to near its capacity to handle
concurrent requests. The overhead of MooseGuard decreases slightly in all types of oper-
ations as the number of clients scales up since the amount of overhead in enclave context
switches and secure channel encryption cost becomes parallelized over multiple clients. Over-
all, MooseGuard imposes only a constant overhead per-client and does not impact the scaling
of concurrent metadata operations by client.
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Figure 11: Metadata Performance over Client Scale
5.3 APPLICATION BENCHMARKS
Analyzing the performance of applications utilizing a distributed file system shows the
holistic cost that MooseGuard incurs. This section of the evaluation considers two common
use cases for a DFS: typical UNIX operations on a shared file system and Spark [60], a
distributed scientific application. These applications utilize file I/O-bound operations such
as sequential, random, and parallel access. They also incorporate metadata-bound operations
during the same runtime, showing how MooseGuard comprehensively affects performance for
end-users.
5.3.1 UNIX Applications
To analyze UNIX application performance, we use the same benchmark used by NeXUS
[27], another paper that utilizes TEEs in a secure file system. This benchmark considers
common UNIX applications that end-users of a shared file system may run. The applications
used are:
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Table 2: UNIX Directory Trees
Workload Files Total Size
large-file-small-dir 32 3.2 GB
medium-file-medium-dir 256 2.5 GB
small-file-large-dir 1024 10 MB
• tar x - Extract a gzip-compressed tar file
• grep - Recursively search for a word in all files
• tar c - Create a tar file
• cp - Recursively copy a directory
• ls - Recursively list and stat a directory
• rm - Recursively remove a directory
Each iteration of the test runs all applications in the order shown against 3 different
directory trees described in Table 2. Between each application, the Linux page cache is
flushed. To observe MooseGuard’s impact on metadata performance, both client metadata
caches for MooseFS are also disabled.
Figure 12 shows the results of this benchmark for stock MooseFS and MooseGuard. These
results show that the holistic overhead of MooseGuard is smaller than the overhead found for
similar microbenchmarks in Sections 5.1 and 5.2. In the small-file-large- dir workload, the
file I/O-bound applications saw a higher overhead than other workloads. In this workload,
the size of each file was 10 KB, where file I/O operations for MooseGuard were performed on
64 KB of encrypted data. These results are consistent with the results of Section 5.1.2 and
could be improved by optimizing the block size of the file system for the use case. Overall,
as the overheads for file I/O and metadata operations mix with applications using the data,
MooseGuard’s performance overhead decreases and suggests that MooseGuard is well suited
for these applications.
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Figure 12: UNIX Application Performance
5.3.2 Spark
Scientific distributed computing is another common use case for distributed file systems.
HDFS, a distributed file system commonly used in conjunction with Spark, and shares a
similar architecture to MooseFS as they both have a name server (master server) and data
servers. To analyze the performance impact of MooseGuard for this use case, we ran a
distributed application with the Spark framework and MooseGuard as the storage service.
Spark and MooseFS were deployed on the same systems, with the MooseFS master and Spark
Cluster Manager on the master server and an instance of a MooseFS client, a MooseFS chunk
server, and Spark Worker on each of the four other servers. The application for Spark was
the KMeans data generator and clustering applications. The amount of data generated was
10,000,000 rows and 24 columns for a total of 2 GB of overall data. The data was divided
into 4 RDD partitions, approximately 458 MB per file, so the work could be parallelized to
all worker nodes.
Table 3 summarizes the results of running KMeans data generation and clustering with
stock MooseFS or MooseGuard as the backing file system. During data generation, the Spark
workload is I/O bound. The file I/O operations during this phase are mainly sequential writes
of large chunks of data, for which MooseGuard performs optimally with a 1.022 overhead. For
the data generation task as a whole, MooseGuard’s overhead is minimal. In the clustering
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Table 3: Spark Performance
Operation Stock (sec) MooseGuard (sec) Overhead
Generate I/O 16.567 16.933 1.022
Generate Total 19.668 19.989 1.016
Clustering I/O 0.626 0.873 1.396
Clustering Total 31.328 33.036 1.055
phase, the Spark workload is CPU-bound and can work around the delays of file I/O to
retrieve data. Despite spending less overall time reading data during the clustering phase,
MooseGuard’s impact is seen with a higher overhead of 1.396 during I/O operations. The
performance in this case is similar to the random read overheads in Section 5.1.2 and suggests
that the overhead here may be attributable to Spark accessing RDD files in a non-sequential
manner. The overhead for the clustering phase in total is smaller at 1.055, as the CPU-bound
portion of this phase dominates the file I/O overhead. Overall, MooseGuard shows that it
is capable of protecting a distributed file system in distributed computing applications with
minimal overheads to the application.
5.4 EVALUATION TAKEAWAYS
MooseGuard showed that it only imposes a constant overhead for file I/O and metadata
options when scaling upward with size or outward with clients. Though performance can vary
on specific block sizes, that attribute can be tuned for specific uses. MooseGuard improves
performance in scaled metadata and concurrent use cases compared to NeXUS by reducing
the overhead from a greater than a linear factor to a constant factor. In applications with
the presence of caching and CPU-bound operations, MooseGuard’s impact can be further
minimized. Overall, the results of this evaluation show that the trade-off of using separate
TEEs to secure metadata and data can greatly reduce typical overheads seen in secure file
systems, allowing a DFS to return to its normal scaled performance.
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6.0 CONCLUSION
Shared storage services provide great utility, but have traditionally required users to
sacrifice the privacy of their data to share it effectively. By employing the use of TEEs,
research has taken steps forward in empowering users so they can keep their data private
and share it without concern that a service provider may leak or abuse their data.
MooseGuard provides another step in this direction. The design of MooseGuard is adapt-
able to many DFSes and uses functionality that is common in TEEs that are becoming more
widely available and adding enhanced features. MooseGuard’s approach provides a blueprint
for securing a distributed file system for shared infrastructure deployments by isolating file
system policy decisions on the master server, performing stricter verification of users, and
encrypting user data. The prototype for MooseGuard demonstrates the feasibility of build-
ing such a system and the results of the evaluation show that with only a constant overhead,
MooseGuard can further enable users to use shared infrastructure to share their data at scale
with confidence in the privacy of their data.
This paper additionally identifies areas of work for future exploration. Within Moose-
Guard, enhancements can be made to further protect the integrity of persistent metadata by
detecting rollback attacks. MooseGuard also currently only supports fork-consistency of re-
voked access to files. This level of consistency can be made stricter by adapting MooseGuard
to consult the master server on finished reads or to optimize the client enclave to complete
reads within a single ECALL. Finally, MooseGuard’s encryption process can be optimized
to reduce the overhead of random access on smaller blocks by leveraging client- side caching
or tuning the block and chunk sizes.
Broadly, MooseGuard’s approach leverages client- and server- side TEEs to perform both
DRM-style key sharing and access revocation, and secured remote computation within the
same application. Distributed applications which require a centralized service for synchro-
nization, while delegating work to client devices can follow this approach to achieve stronger
security. These improvements to MooseGuard and broader concepts are left for future work
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